Policy Considerations: Alienability of the Beneficial Interest in a Trust in New York by Sparks, Bertel M.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 9 Number 1 Article 3 
10-1-1959 
Policy Considerations: Alienability of the Beneficial Interest in a 
Trust in New York 
Bertel M. Sparks 
New York University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Bertel M. Sparks, Policy Considerations: Alienability of the Beneficial Interest in a Trust in New York, 9 
Buff. L. Rev. 26 (1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss1/3 
This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: ALIENABILITY OF THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST
IN A TRUST IN NEW YORK*
By BERTEL M. SPARKS*
N NEW YORK there exists a sharp contrast between the prevailing
attitude toward the free alienability of property in general and the
extremely restrictive attitudes toward the alienability of the beneficial interest
in a trust. It is the purpose of this paper to inquire into whether or not any
such paradox is necessary, and whether or not it is serving any useful purpose.
Any reasonable examination of this inconsistency will require us to take a
look at the nature of the trust relationship, the manner in which that relation-
ship was developed, and the present rules of law governing the alienability of
the beneficiary's interest.
There are people who believe that all trusts are evil, that they should
be eliminated wherever feasible, and that where they can't be eliminated they
should be regulated and controlled in the most rigid way possible. I am not
one of those people. Nothing said herein is to be construed as any disparage-
ment of the trust as an institution. As a legal device for holding and disposing
of property, the modem trust is the crowning achievement of the common law.
It is a mark of maturity in our legal system. It is as flexible and as elastic as
contract or agency, and it serves many functions not reached by either of
these relationships. Common law lawyers are justified in the special pride they
take in the development of the trust for it is a distinctively unique achievement
of the common law. It has no counterpart in the civil law, and civil law
lawyers find it one of the most difficult concepts for them to understand when
they try to acquaint themselves with the operation of our legal system. But
the trust is far more than a unique legal achievement. It is a practical
response to the needs and wishes of the members of a highly organized society.
The purposes to which it may be put are almost as unlimited as the imagination
of the lawyer drafting the trust instrument. Businessmen often find the trust
a convenient financing or risk shifting device. The trust can be used in the
liquidation of business affairs. It can be used as a security device. Voting
trusts are often used in corporate management. Trust receipts are not
unfamiliar items in sales transactions. The trust serves all these needs and
many others, but probably the most significant purpose of all is that of
providing a convenient scheme for handling family settlements.
In a paper such as this, one might be expected to take some troublesome
area of trust administration and attempt to analyze the law applicable to that
area. I have chosen a different approach. I am going to assume that there is
nothing new that I can tell you about the existing rules controlling the alien-
ability of the beneficial interest in a trust. You already know about
* This article is based upon an address delivered at Utica, New York, April 23,
1959, before the combined Bar Associations of Herkimer, Madison, and Oneida Counties.
** Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
New York Real Property Law Section 103 and New York Personal Property
Law Section 15. You know that these statutes affirmatively restrain the
alienation of an income beneficiary's interest in a trust. You know as much
as I do about how these rules operate. The thing I propose to do is to
ask a few questions about why these rules exist and whether or not their
present form is endangering the very life of the trust institution. In pursuing
this inquiry it will be necessary for us to take a few long steps back through
the pages of history for the purpose of recalling to our minds how the trust
arose and why it is still with us.
The trust, like every other legal device known to our system of jurispru-
dence, had its origin in human needs. It arose as a means of satisfying an
end which seemed desirable at the time. At first it was not called a trust
but was referred to as a use. John Smith wanted to give Blackacre to his son,
Sam, without imposing upon Sam the legal obligations incident to property
ownership. John accomplished this by giving Blackacre to X to the use of
Sam. By this simple transaction John was carrying out what has always been
the primary function of a trust. He was separating the benefits of ownership
from the burdens of ownership. That same purpose is being fulfilled in
1959 when a husband bequeaths the major portion of his estate to a trustee
for the benefit of his wife and children. This separation of the benefits of
ownership from the burdens of ownership is not, and never has been, within
itself, an improper or antisocial act. It is a means through which worthy
goals may be accomplished. Here again it might be added that probably the
most worthy, as well as the most common, objective of the trust is that of
providing for families.
It is impossible to determine exactly when the use was first employed
as a means of handling property dispositions but it appears to have been in
operation not long after the Norman Conquest.1 In its beginnings it depended
entirely upon personal honor, honesty, or reliability. It was not recognized
by the courts and did not carry with it any rights or obligations capable of
being enforced. When John conveyed Blackacre to X to the use of Sam,
John's only assurance that X would permit Sam to enjoy the use was the
honesty or integrity of X. A relationship resting upon such a precarious
foundation was not suited to commercial purposes, but it was employed on a
large scale in family settlements and in making provisions for religious
orders. If X could be depended upon to permit Sam to enjoy the property,
even though Sam had no enforceable rights in or to that property, Sam
was given the benefit of a perfect spendthrift trust. He could avoid payment of
debts, avoid his feudal obligations, avoid forfeiture of his lands if he committed
1. The earliest available evidence of any extensive utilization of this relationship
occurred a little over three hundred years after the Conquest. By that time the use
had become such a common scheme for holding title to land that a statute was enacted
restraining its employment as a means of avoiding creditors. 50 EDw. HI c. 6 (1376).
This would seem to indicate that it had been in process of development from a much
earlier date.
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treason, avoid the strict rules of law regulating property transfers, and obtain
many other advantages not otherwise available to him.
It is not surprising that such a handy device as the use was employed
extensively even when no tribunal for its enforcement was available. Neither
is it surprising that it came to be used for some unworthy purposes. One
such purpose was the avoidance of creditors. As early as 1376 the employment
of the use to achieve this particular objective was prohibited by statute.2
But pressures of another kind were building up. The use was becoming such
a popular institution that cestuis que use were demanding judicial recognition
of their rights. Eventually the chancellor extended such recognition by giving
the cestui que use a remedy against the unfaithful feoffee to uses. In modern
terminology we would say the beneficiary was given a remedy against the
trustee. The earliest known decree of this kind was handed down in 1446.3
Armed with this kind of official recognition the already popular use became
even more popular. That increased popularity and the granting of official
recognition by the chancellor made it increasingly important that the use
be more specifically identified in the legal system. The nature of the bene-
ficiary's interest was in need of a more precise definition. At first it had the
appearance of a mere chose in action. The fcoffee to uses or the trustee
"owned" the property but the chancellor would compel him to hold it in
accordance with the terms of the use. But choses in action were not trans-
ferable in those days, and long before the law recognized their assignability
the cestui que use was permitted to assign his interest in the use. This gave
the use a status somewhat above that of a chose in action. At least as
early as the 16th century, and probably earlier, the cestui was recognized as
an alienable interest in property.4 That alienability gave an added flexibility
and, therein, an added utility to the use as a means of holding property.
That added utility can be demonstrated in many ways. Almost from its
very beginnings the use was resorted to as a means of avoiding feudal dues.
In those days feudal dues constituted a major source of revenue to the crown.
The feudal obligation operated as a form of inheritance tax. But feudal
obligations were governed by the legal title, or rather by the seisin. The
obligation could be avoided by placing the seisin or legal title in a feoffee to
uses or trustee. Avoiding taxes was as popular then as it is now. By the
beginning of the 16th century so much of the land of England was held
subject to uses that very little revenue was being realized from that source.
The result was that the funds available to Henry VIII were in short supply.
In his efforts to "plug the loophole" the distinguished monarch had a statute
enacted which appeared to abolish the use.5 It provided that transactions
which theretofore created a use would thereafter give the beneficiary the legal
2. 50 EDw. III c. 6 (1376).
3. Myrfyn v. Fallan, 2 Cal. Ch. = (1446).
4. ST. Gamtx, DOCTOR AxND STUDENT Dial. II, c. 22, pp. 171-172 (17th ed. 1787)
(original edition published in 1518).
5. STATuTE OF USES, 1536, 27 HN. VIII, c. 10.
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*title or the seisin. On its face this statute appeared to sound the death knell
for the use. But the use had become too important a device to property owners
and estate planners for them to give it up without a fight. Within a short
time ways were discovered by which uses could be created in spite of the
statute. In the meantime additional functions for the use were being dis-
covered. It was out of this development that the modem trust emerged. It is
no exaggeration to say that the trust grew out of a statute designed to destroy it.
The important point is that the trust did survive. It survived in spite
of legislation designed to abolish it. The reason for its survival is that it was
responding to an important human need in such a way that the community
as a whole refused to let it go. But the fact that it survived that test is no
assurance that it can never be destroyed. It endured then, and it will continue
to endure so long as it continues as a convenient and efficient means of handling
needed property arrangements. When it ceases to be useful or when it refuses
to adapt itself to the forces of social and economic growth, it will destroy itself.
In spite of all the useful and socially desirable functions served by the
trust, the fact remains that it can be used to frustrate or hinder rather than
to promote economic development. It can be used as an instrument through
which a past generation reaches out to control the property arrangements of
the living. It is well settled that a man cannot make an absolute disposition
of his property, and at the same time, impose upon his transferee a prohibition
against his ever selling it. Such a restraint upon alienation is void however
short the period of the restraint. 6 If it is undertaken, the transfer is valid
but the restraint is invalid. If such a restraint is obnoxious to our public
policy, is it made any less obnoxious by using a trust as an instrument through
which the restraint is imposed? Let's suppose that our friend John Smith
has amassed a great fortune but is convinced that his son Sam will be unable
to manage that fortune properly. John leaves his fortune to a trustee with
direction to pay Sam the income for life or until Sam arrives at a certain age.
John expressly prohibits Sam from assigning or transferring his beneficial
interest in the trust in any way. Sam has a valuable property interest, but he
is restricted in the things he can do with that property interest. He has a
right to receive income, but he is prohibited from selling that right. The fact
that Sam would like to cash in on his interest and invest the whole thing in
the development of a new business makes no difference.
Should this direct restraint on the alienation of property, which would be
void if it were applied to a legal interest, be upheld because the property in-
volved is the beneficial interest in a trust? The English courts answered this
question in the negative. The trust was upheld but John's direction that the
beneficiary, Sam, could not sell his interest was of no effect.7 It should be noted
that in reaching this decision the trust institution was not attacked. The
conclusion arrived at was nothing more than a conclusion that any man who is
6. Sms & SmITr, FuORE INTREsTs § 1143 (2d ed. 1956).
7. Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jun. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811).
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sui juris is free to transfer his property interests according to his own wishes,
and the fact that the interest concerned is the beneficial interest in a trust
makes no difference. It preserves the freedom of the present generation to use,
dispose, or dissipate its own wealth according to its own desires free from any
control by the past. But when the question arose in the United States, a
peculiar development occurred. This country which has always prided itself
on such things as a dynamic economy and individual freedom, emphasized
the freedom of the past at the expense of the present. John, the deceased
testator who had amassed a fortune within his lifetime, but who had gone on
to his reward, was permitted to issue his private decree from the grave prohibit-
ing Sam from selling such part of that fortune as had been left to Sam. The
intention of the testator had to be carried out.8 Just why it is necessary to
carry out the intention of a testator with reference to the alienability of the
beneficial interest in a trust when that same intention may be ignored if
applied to a legal interest has never been very clear.
But entirely aside from spendthrift trust provisions imposing direct
restraints upon the alienation of the beneficiary's interest, other restrictions
upon his freedom of action are sometimes attempted. Suppose John had given
his fortune to a trustee to pay Sam the income until Sam arrived at age 35 at
which time Sam was to receive the principal. Sam is now 25. He wishes to
take the principal now, terminate the trust, and use the principal to buy a
home or start a new business. Is there any reason why Sam should not be
permitted to carry out his wishes? Again the English courts refused to give
effect to such a restraint upon Sam's freedom. If he was the sole beneficiary,
and if he was sui juris, he was permitted to bring the trust to an end regardless
of the wishes of the testator.9 But an American court, in Claflin v. Claflin,10
held that the wishes of the testator were inviolate. The trust had to continue
even though by its very terms no one other than Sam could ever benefit from
it and Sam desired its termination. Most American courts have accepted both
the Claflin doctrine and the spendthrift trust doctrine. In doing so they have
permitted the dead hand to place a crippling restraint on property transfers
in a way considered too antisocial and uneconomic to be tolerated in the
18th century.
It is surprising that such developments should have occurred in a country
where heavy emphasis has usually been placed upon the free movement of
property of all kinds and upon the maintenance of the free market as the best
way of insuring a continually expanding economy. But what has happened
in New York is even more surprising. While other states have debated
whether testators should be permitted to impose spendthrift trust provisions
upon their beneficiaries, New York has long had statutes compelling them to
8. Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882).
9. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841).
10. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
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do so. Our statutes," enacted more than a hundred years ago, prohibit the
beneficiary of an income trust from transferring his interest. The prohibition
in New York does not depend upon the intention of the testator. It is a com-
mand of the legislature. It is made a part of the nature of the trust itself.
In this state inability of the beneficiary of an income trust to transfer his
interest in a trust has been so long accepted that most of us have ceased to
question it.
The need for reform in the property law of New York is so generally
recognized that it has become almost trite to mention it. That our property
law is unnecessarily complicated and dangerously uncertain in its operation
is well known. As early as 1886 John Chipman Gray declared that "in no
civilized country is the making of a will so delicate an operation, and so likely
to fail of success, as in New York."' 2 That sentiment has been the almost
unanimous conclusion of legal scholars from that day to this.' 3 Professor
Walsh described the law on perpetuities in New York as "a disgrace to the
bar of the state."' 4 The thing we have too often overlooked is that most of
the complexities about which we complain are complexities brought on by the
efforts of the legislature or the courts to make our spendthrift trust provisions
workable and tolerable in a free economy. Thus, most of our efforts at reform
have consisted of attacks upon the symptoms rather than attacks upon the
disease itself.
New York Real Property Law Section 103 and New York Personal Prop-
erty Law Section 15 are express mandates for the spendthrift trust. By implica-
tion they establish the Claflin doctrine as well. If the beneficiary is unable to
transfer his interest in a trust, it would seem to follow that he cannot terminate
the trust even though he is the sole beneficiary. A sensible policy consideration
supporting this restriction is difficult to find. If Sam is receiving the entire in-
come from a trust and if he, and he alone, is to receive the principal at age
35, what valid reason can anyone give for not permitting Sam to terminate
the trust at age 30 if he wants to? By restraining Sam's liberty it seems that
we are tying up property unnecessarily and benefiting no one. New York
has attempted to give some relief against this situation by providing that the
settlor may revoke a trust which he has established provided he obtains the
consent of all persons beneficially interested.' 5 No reason has been suggested
why a settlor who has retained no interest in the subject matter of the trust
should be permitted to revoke it but few will oppose the statute since it at
least gives some relief against another unreasonable restriction. In fact it has
been construed in a way to permit the settlor to revoke a trust without the
consent of possible unborn beneficiaries. 16 But if the settlor is dead the trust
11. N.Y. PERs. PRoP. LAw § 15; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 103.
12. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAwnST PEmR PnunEs § 750 (1st ed. 1886).
13. See 5 Powax, REAL PROPERTY fI 807 (1956).
14. From the preface to WAMsu, FUTuRE ESTATES iN NEw YORK (1931).
15. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 23; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 118.
16. Smith v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E.2d 72 (1942).
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cannot be revoked even after all possible beneficiaries are in being and consent-
ing to its termination. The result is that there is probably no other state in
the Union where the termination of a trust is so easy if the settlor is alive
and no state where it is more difficult if the settlor is dead. No sound public
policy is being furthered by such self-contradictory rules.
Our statutes authorizing a settlor to revoke a trust provided he has the
consent of all persons beneficially interested have done more than create
contradictions. No New York lawyer needs to be reminded of the flood of
litigation that has been spawned by these provisions. The thing of which we
do need to be reminded is that the statutory authorization itself would not
have been necessary if common law rules had been applied to the alienability
of the beneficiary's interest in a trust in this state. Such rules would permit
an adult beneficiary to do as he pleases with his own interest, a result not
possible under present New York law. They would extend no authority to
a beneficiary or anyone else to destroy the interests of other unborn bene-
ficiaries, a result which is possible under present New York law.
There is scarcely any end to the catalogue of technical, complicated,
litigation-producing rules in this state that have been designed for the sole
purpose of maintaining some degree of free alienability of property without
altering the statutory spendthrift trust. Our spendthrift trust statutes have
placed the trust into a strait jacket and made it a thing to be feared. One
result of that fear was the intolerable two-lives rule which plagued us for so
many years in perpetuities cases. In 1958 the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities was extended from two lives to any number of lives.17 This change
is a welcome one but we are still without the flexibility of a 21-year period in
gross which is available in most other states.' 8 The principal factor delaying
this much needed reform for so many years and the principal factor preventing
further reforms is the existence of our statutes against the alienation of the
beneficial interest in an income trust. Under existing conditions any extension
of the permitted period of the Rule Against Perpetuities means an extension of
the permitted period for an inalienable, indestructible trust. But we have
given entirely too little attention to the questions why should the beneficial
interest in a trust remain inalienable, and why should a trust remain inde-
structible. If we center our attention upon these items, we might find further
reforms possible. And until the Rule Against Perpetuities is further modified,
the citizens of New York are denied the freedom, the flexibility, and the
simplicity available in other parts of the country. It is the inability of a
beneficiary to do as he pleases with his interest in a trust, not the trust relation-
ship itself, that makes the idea of long term trusts repulsive to our notions of
a free economy. Suppose the beneficiary of a trust is free to transfer his
17. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1958, c. 152-53.
18. The only minority provisions possible are the two limited types possible before
the amendment. In re Trevor, 239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E. 66 (1924) ; Manice v. Manice, 43 N.Y.
303 (1871).
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interest if he so desires. Suppose further that he, together with all others
beneficially interested in the trust, can join in its termination as soon as they
are all identified and all over 21 years of age. Under such conditions there
would appear little need for a statute restricting the trust's duration.
Another statute which has the effect of discriminating against the citizens
of New York, and which is made necessary by our rules against the alienation
of the beneficiary's interest in a trust is our statute against accumulations.19
In the past our rules against accumulations have been so restrictive that it has
been unsafe for settlors to make simple provisions for reserves for depreciation,
or for authorizing trustees to make decisions as to what is income and what is
principal.20 New York residents have been deprived of the privilege of em-
ploying the accumulation trust as a means of saving on their income tax al-
though that privilege was readily available to the citizens of other parts of
the country.21 These are only a few of many reasonable plans that have been
prevented in New York by our statutes prohibiting accumulations of income
except for the benefit of a minor and then for his minority only.2 2 The 1959
amendment extending the permitted period for accumulations to the permitted
period for the suspension of the power of alienation gives considerable relief
in these cases.23 Many of the plans heretofore prohibited may be employed
after September 1, 1959. But even under the new law, New Yorkers are still
denied the freedom and the flexibility available in other states where a limited
period in gross is permitted for the accumulation of income. I do not think
the period permitted for accumulations should be any different from the period
of the Rule Against Perpetuities. The 1959 amendment makes the two periods
the same in New York. That much is desirable. But why can't we add a limited
period of time unconnected with lives in both instances? If the reason offered
is that under such a rule too much property would be tied up in indestructible
trusts, it is time we remembered that trusts would not be so indestructible
if it were not for our peculiar laws making them that way.
There are numerous other rules of law in this state made necessary by
our legislative requirement that trusts be spendthrift. Our statutes making
a limited amount of the beneficial interest subject to the claims of creditors24
would be unnecessary if that interest were freely transferable. If it were
freely transferable, there would be no reason why a creditor could not reach
it in the way he reaches any other equitable asset owned by the debtor.
There are also situations where these spendthrift trust statutes manifest
themselves in a way to bring about results directly opposed to that apparently
19. N.Y. PARS. PROP. LAW § 16; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 61.
20. For an analysis of the restrictive nature of the New York statutes see 5 POWELL,
REAL PROPFRTY ff 833 (1956). A reserve for depreciation was permitted in In re Kaplan's
Will, 195 Misc. 132, 88 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Surr. Ct., Kings Co. 1949).
21. Powell, Changes in the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Accumulations:
A Report and a Proposal, 58 COL. L. R v. 1196, 1207 (1958).
22. See note 19 supra.
23. N.Y. S.ss. LAws 1959, c. 453-454.
24. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 684, 693; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 98.
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intended by the legislature. Suppose John devises his estate to Sam for life
remainder to such persons as Sam shall appoint. At common law Sam's creditors
could reach Sam's life estate to satisfy their claims, but they could not reach
the remainder so long as Sam did not exercise the power.25 This was on the
theory that the power was not property but merely an ability to get property.
However, if Sam exercised the power by appointing to a volunteer, the creditor
could reach the estate.20 It was said that Sam would have to be just before
he would be permitted to be generous. Statutes were enacted in New York"7
and elsewhere providing that if the power was a general power which Sam
could exercise for his own benefit, the appointive property would be subject
to the claims of creditors whether the power was exercised or not. It is doubt-
ful if anyone in the legislature or elsewhere anticipated that this statute might
curtail rather than extend the rights of creditors in some situations, but that
is exactly what happened. In the case of CUtting v. CuttingH8 Sam's life estate
was in trust. He had a general power of appointment and the power was
exercised. At common law this would have made the appointive property
available to the claims of creditors. The Court of Appeals held that the
creditors' rights statute did not apply and the remainder could not be reached.
The reason for this peculiar result was that the language of the statute was
construed as applying only in those cases where the donee of the power could
appoint an absolute fee in possession within his lifetime. Since Sam's life
estate was in trust and therefore inalienable, it failed to qualify under the
statutory provision.
The fundamental objection to our spendthrift trust statutes is that they
are wholly out of harmony with the public policy of this state as expressed in
other statutory and common law rules. The strong policy which this state has
favoring the free alienation of property is manifested in a number of ways. The
creditors' rights statute just referred to is one such manifestation. It was
designed to prevent the withholding of property from the claims of creditors
when the debtor has an absolute power to make it his own. Another manifesta-
tion of New York's policy against the tying up of property is our statute
empowering settlors to revoke existing trusts.20 These and other statutes
could be cited to indicate the extent to which the tying up of property is re-
pulsive to the public policy of New York. On the other hand the New York
statutory restraints upon the alienation of the beneficial interest in a trust
have converted the trust itself into one of the most pernicious restrictions
known to the law.
There is nothing new in the statement that the restrictive type of trust
called for by our statutes is repulsive to our own public policy favoring the free
movement and the free economic development of property. This fact has long
25. Sn:s & Smrm, FUTuRE INTERESTS § 944 (2d ed. 1956).
26. Id. at § 945.
27. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 149.
28. 86 N.Y. 522 (1881).
29. N.Y. PErs. PROP. LAW § 23; N.Y. REA PROP. LAW § 118.
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been recognized. The difficulty is that in the past we have not attacked the
real problem. Instead of centering our attention upon the removal of the
obnoxious restrictions we have enacted laws restricting the duration and the
utility of the trust. For over a hundred years we have had, and we still have
one of the most crippling, restrictive, and rigid rules against perpetuities known
to the common law world. We are told that such restrictions are necessary
in this state because of our strong policy against tying up property. It is time
we realized that it is our effort to put trusts into a strait jacket, not the dura-
tion of trusts, that really ties up property.
The 1958 amendment to the Rule Against Perpetuities and the 1959
amendment to the rule against accumulations are both wholesome improve-
ments in the property law of this state. But further reforms are needed. A
detailed study and possible overhaul of our property law as a whole is long
overdue. The appropriate agency for directing such a study and for achieving
the appropriate reforms is the State Bar. Any such study should begin with
an examination of our spendthrift trust statutes. Maybe some recognition of
protective trusts in very limited situations will be considered desirable. But
the wholesale requirement that all income trusts be spendthrift trusts is
indefensible.
I don't need to remind you of how our present laws are driving trust
business to our sister states where the trust climate is a little more favorable.
When New York residents are forced to establish foreign trusts in order to
obtain the flexible estate plans they desire, they are placed at a disadvantage
in many ways. The inconvenience involved is a high price for 'them to pay.
In addition to that, they have to leave their local trust officers and seek the
services of foreign trust companies. This means dealing with strangers. It
also means employing legal counsel in the foreign state and leaving the New
York lawyers unemployed.
The citizens of New York are entitled to better treatment. They are
entitled to the privilege of establishing reasonable estate plans without leaving
the state to do it. There is no reason why the Empire State should remain
the most difficult place in the civilized world in which to make a testamentary
disposition. There is no reason why the wealthiest state in the Union should
force its citizens*to leave the state in order to make reasonable dispositions of
their wealth. The responsibility for establishing a more favorable trust climate
is up to the legal profession. The legal profession of New York is being
challenged to meet that responsibility. If the profession fails, New York
citizens will remain the most discriminated against inhabitants of the United
States, and the lawyers themselves can expect to be deprived of more and
more business which would otherwise be theirs.
